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Abstract 
Corporate bonds issued by the four major commercial banks in South Africa, which account for 
61% of the market, and their respective earning announcements in the period 1 January 2013 to 
31 December 2014 were used to analyse the reaction of daily corporate bond prices to the 
earnings announcements of South African companies. The reaction of the daily corporate bond 
prices to earnings announcements was empirically analysed using cross sectional regressions. 
We concluded that on average the South African corporate bond market incorporates any new 
information from earnings announcements. We also investigated if the asymmetrical payoff 
structure of corporate bonds causes daily prices to be more sensitive to bad earnings 
announcements than good earnings announcements. Our investigation found that daily corporate 
bond prices are insensitive to both bad and good earnings announcements. Lastly, we analysed if 
the lack of infrastructure and liquidity in the corporate bond market hinders corporate bonds in 
incorporating information relative to the stock market, which has better infrastructure and 
liquidity. We observed that both corporate bonds and stocks on average incorporate new 
information from earnings announcements, irrespective of illiquidity and the absence of adequate 
infrastructure in the South African corporate bond market, 
 
1. Introduction 
The long term debt market is the least developed financial market segment in Africa. The growth 
in the African debt market is largely attributable to the government bond market. The corporate 
bond market has traditionally lagged the government bond market. Underdevelopment of the 
corporate bond market in most African countries is largely underlined by slow growth in the 
government debt market.  Domestic debt is predominately of a short term nature.  Domestic debt 
issues are infrequent and small in volume therefore resulting in an illiquid debt market and lack 
of reliable benchmarks.  
The African debt market infrastructure (including clearing, settlement and systems) is basic or 
inadequate. Market microstructure problems such as small size, low liquidity, lack of long term 
maturities and limited investor base pose challenges to the debt market development and debt 
 	 Page	2	 		 	
strategy in Africa. Mitigating these challenges and problems require sound and stable 
macroeconomic policy, stable political environment, develop market infrastructure and introduce 
a reliable yield curve.  
External debt dominates the African debt market as a result of dependence on concessional 
multilateral, bilateral funding and underdeveloped local markets (Andrianaivo and Yartey, 
2010). African external debt has been historically unsustainable (Muhanji and Ojah, 2011).  
External debt sustainability refers to the ability of a country to meet the current and future 
external debt obligations of both private and public sectors without running into arrears, recourse 
to debt-rescheduling, and a need for balance-of-payments adjustment (Akyüz, 2007).  Most 
African countries have repeatedly rescheduled their external debts which in turn has worsened 
their external debt problems.  The vicious cycle of unsustainable external indebtedness in 
African countries is deeply rooted in infrastructural problems, such as a narrow export base, 
weak institutions and governance, poor domestic resource mobilization, and inadequate debt 
management capacity (Muhanji and Ojah, 2011). However, researchers (such as Claessens, 
1990) provided evidence that external debt can aid economic growth and development when 
used productively and at sustainable thresholds. IMF recommend sustainable thresholds to be 
GDP ratio of 80%, debt to exports ratio of 60% and short term debt to reserves ratio of 80%. The 
World Bank corresponding recommendations given are 250%, 150% and 130% respectively. 
(Muhanji and Ojah, 2011).    
The financial carnage of the Asian Crisis in the late 1990s may have been minimised if there was 
a well developed long term bond market (Johannsson, 2008). Therefore, bond markets are 
integral to the establishment of an efficient financial market as they lead to the generation of 
competitive interest rates that reflect true cost of funds at a wide range of maturities (Jeanneau 
and Tovar, 2008).True cost of funds reflected in bonds will encourage competitive pricing 
between the bond market and bank loans (Jeanneau and Tovar, 2008). A well functioning bond 
market in the financial markets allows for risk management in the financial markets though 
diversification therefore offering the economy stability against financial shocks (Jeanneau and 
Tovar, 2008). A competitive bond market allows for capital to be efficiently appropriated among 
investors within the financial markets (Johannsson, 2008). Currency and maturity mismatch 
issues are resolved through the issuing of long term bonds denominated in local currency. A 
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maturity mismatch arises when companies rely on short term debt (such as call deposits) to 
finance long term projects. Currency and maturity mismatches simultaneously occur when 
companies look to the international markets to raise foreign short term debt to finance locally 
denominated long term projects (Jeanneau and Tovar, 2008). Short term foreign debt is of a 
volatile nature as international investors may abruptly pull their funding from emerging markets 
on demand (Johannsson, 2008) and place it in safe havens such as US treasury bills if they 
suspect a looming financial shock. A non-existent bond market may also lead to debt issues 
being concentrated in the commercial banking sector (Jeanneau and Tovar, 2008). Over reliance 
on the commercial banking sector may result in a bank credit crunch if a financial crisis occurs. 
An economy hit with a bank credit crunch may face a recession.  An active bond market allows 
companies to have alternative sources of funding therefore hedging the economy against the 
adverse effects of a bank credit crunch (Jeanneau and Tovar, 2008). The bond market facilitates 
the efficient pricing of credit risk by way of various continuous disclosure requirements imposed 
by regulators. It also enhances the transparency and disclosure of companies through the access 
provided by capital markets (ISOCO, 2011). 
The ability of the bond market to realise the above mentioned benefits dependence on its 
information efficiency.  Little has been written about the information efficiency of the African 
bond markets. 
This paper examines the South African corporate bond market’s response to the earnings 
announcements of South African companies.  The results may be of interest to legislators, South 
African Reserve Bank and investors. It will also contribute to the much needed finance literature 
around information efficiency in the South African corporate bond market. 
The paper is organized as follows: chapter two provides a brief overview of the South African 
bond market, chapter three discusses literature on the informational efficiency of financial 
markets, chapter four outlines the main hypothesis, data, and research design and lastly chapter 
five is the empirical analysis and interpretation of the results. 
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2. South African Bond Market  
2.1 Bond Market background¹ 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the bond market was mainly an over the counter (OTC) market 
comprising of government bonds and quasi government bonds. The government bonds were 
issued on an open end tap basis. The South African Reserve Bank operated as the principal 
underwriter. The bond market lacked basic infrastructure such as a regulated body, government 
benchmark bonds or yield curve. A brief timeline of bond market development in South Africa is 
as follows: 
1980s - In 1981, Eskom was the first public entity to issue bonds, followed by the National 
treasury, Landbank, Telkom and Transnet. The E168 became the first benchmark bond.  
1987- An inquiry into the bond market conducted by Jacobs and Stals was commissioned with 
the purpose of making recommendations to strengthen the efficiency of the bond market. The 
Jacobs and Stals’ report made the following market defining recommendations: (1) the bond 
market was to be regulated by either the market or the South African Reserve Bank. The market 
chose self-regulation. In 1987, the Bond Market Association (BMA) was created to fulfill the 
function of self regulation in the bond market. The BMA consisted of bond issuers, 
intermediaries, banks, brokers and investors. (2) Consolidation of a number of small issues into 
benchmark bonds.  (3) Creation of a yield curve. (4) Adoption of a well communicated and 
structured auction system. 
1989 - The major clearing and bond settlement banks along with SARB created Universal 
Exchange Corporation Ltd (UNEXCor) in order to develop an electronic settlement system using 
a central securities depository (Sengupta et al, 2014).  
1990 - The National Treasury consolidated a number of small issues to create R150 and R153. 
 
¹The historical account was largely based on Jones (2002), Guma (2007), Sengupta et al (2014), Hove (2008), Ojah and Pillay 
(2009), and BESA circular 
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1991 - The R150 replaced E168 bond as the benchmark bond 
1992 - SA Breweries listed the first corporate bond on BMA 
1994 - UNEXCor was appointed as the clearing house for the bond market. A secondary market 
in government bonds was created. 
1995 - Gilt trading was moved from the JSE floor to BMA. BMA operated with an informal 
screen and telephone system with UNEXCor serving as the clearing house. 
1996 - The BMA was granted an exchange license and started trading on 15 May 1996. BMA 
was renamed the Bond Exchange of South Africa. The exchange operated within the rules and 
directives set by Financial Services Board (FSB) (Oxford Business Group, 2008). South Africa 
decided to follow the widely accepted regular auctions practice as a method of selling primary 
issues of government securities. 
1997 - BESA moves to t+ 3 rolling settlement. BESA became the first exchange in Africa to 
fully achieve compliance with G30 Recommendations for Clearing and Settlement. The first 
Collateralized Debt Obligation was listed (INCA BOND) in BESA. 
1998 - South African Reserve Bank (SARB) was made responsible for conducting auctions of 
benchmark bonds on behalf of the National Treasury. The National Treasury appointed 12 
Primary Dealers to make a market in seven government bonds. The open outcry-trading floor 
was closed due to a low turnover of 10%. 
2000- Members began booking all trades on a new Bond Automated Trading System ("BATS"). 
BESA implemented the Total Return Index ('TRI") and the All Bond Index (ALBI). ALBI is 
comprised of 20 different bonds, which are selected based on their size and liquidity. The two 
sub-sections of the ALBI are the Government Bond Index ("GOVI") and the Other Bond Index 
("OTHI"). The first CPI-linked bond issued by National Treasury listed. 
2001- The corporate bond started to experience a pickup in growth. Four factors catalysed the 
growth in corporate bonds: (i) lower interest rates (ii) underleveraged corporates (iii) reduction in 
fiscal deficit resulting in low supply of new government debt; and (iv)implementation of 
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BASEL-II norms(Rand Merchant Bank, 2001). BESA lists first mortgage-backed securitisation. 
The National Treasury introduced strip programme for: R150, R153, R157, R186 and R194. The 
National Treasury implemented 'Buy Back' programmes and switches. 
2002 - BESA listed first receivable and credit swap synthetic securitisations and index-linked 
contract. BESA issued new listing disclosure requirements and rules. 
2006 – BESA was demutualised and became a private company. 305 corporate bonds were 
issued by the end of 2006. During this period financial services were the biggest issuers of 
corporate bonds because non financial corporations issued only 22 of the total outstanding 
corporate bonds.  
Until the day it was purchased by the JSE in 2009, BESA had never experienced any bond 
defaults and no claim had been made on the Guarantee Fund. BESA had also never closed its 
market during market disruptions 
2008 - The JSE made a SENS announcement on Monday, 27 October 2008 about its firm 
intention to make an offer for all the BESA ordinary shares in issue. 
2009 - The competition tribunal approved the merger of BESA and JSE on the 3 June 2009. The 
JSE purchased all shares on issue for R125 each. BESA became a wholly owned subsidiary of 
the JSE on 22 June 2009. The value of the transaction was R240.6m. Post the merger the bond 
exchange was renamed the JSE Debt Market.  
2013 - At the end of 2013 there were only eight remaining primary dealers from the 12 dealers 
appointed in the 1990s. The corporate bond market experienced its first default in its history 
when First Strut, a listed corporate bond defaulted. 
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2.2 Current Bond Market Overview² 
2.2.1 Size 
 
The JSE debt market is the largest listed debt market on the African continent by market 
capitalization and liquidity. In the South African bond market, issuance is typically dominated by 
the government sector (Figure 1), which currently accounts for 61% (value R1.1 trillion) of the 
total listed debt on the JSE as at 31 march 2014, up from the prior year’s 60%. This 1% increase 
is equivalent to R149.8 billion, which was the greatest increase in issuance recorded in the past 
year.  
There has been an increase in government bond issuance since the 2009 global recession due to 
the government implementing a counter cyclical fiscal policy of increasing expenditure to boost 
a slow growth economy (National Treasury, 2014). The financial sector is the second largest 
contributor to the listed debt market with 17%, which equates to an increase in outstanding debt 
of R 27.2 billion in the current period. This is a significant achievement as one of the financial 
services functions is to attract funds from the households and corporates and loan these funds out 
to capital deficit investors(Ojah and Pillay, 2009). 
 
²The current bond market overview is based on the JSE website and National Treasury debt management report 2013/2014. 
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State owned companies’ outstanding listed debt amounted to 13% of total listed debt. State 
owned companies also added a sizeable amount of R 26 billion to their outstanding debt during 
the year as compared to the prior year. Both the financial sector and stated owned companies 
proportion of total listed debt remained the same year on year. Since SAB listed the first 
corporate bond in 1992 there has been more than 1500 corporate bonds issued on the JSE debt 
market. 
2.2.2 Composition 
 
Fixed rate debt accounts for 68% of primary listings on the JSE (Figure 2). Issuers prefer to issue 
fixed rate debt as it allows them to lock in the interest rate at the time of issue therefore creating 
certainty around the cost of funds (National Treasury, 2014). The fixed rate debt was the bulk of 
the net increase in debt issuance during the period with an increase of R149.8 billion. Inflation 
linked listings and floating rate notes are the remaining larger contributors to the composition of 
primary listings with 14% and 15% respectively. Inflation linked issuance and floating rate notes 
also experienced growth during the year with an increase in issuance of R19.8 billion and R40.1 
billion respectively.  
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In terms of sector composition (Figure 3), Government fixed rate debt make up a significant 
portion of total government debt with an 82% proportion. Financial sectors have a more 
cosmopolitan composition than the government sector with majority of debt being inflation 
linked and credit linked notes. 
2.2.3 Secondary market 
 
The secondary market is dominated by OTC trading. Due to the OTC market operating on a 
report basis, transactions are not concluded in real time. Transactions are reported after they have 
been concluded and settled. The main participants in the secondary markets are brokers, interdeal 
brokers, market makers and investors. The secondary market has expanded from R 11 trillion in 
2000 to R21 trillion in 2011. The trading activity in the secondary market simmered down in 
2013 from R25.1 trillion to R22.4 trillion. The slowdown in the secondary market is indicative of 
lower trading activity and liquidity due to US monetary policy shocks (such as reduction in 
quantitative easing by the US). The repo market was the main driver of trading volumes between 
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2011 and 2013, accounting for 67% in 2011, 68% in 2012 and 68% in 2013 of the total trade 
volumes. The bond turnover for the past decade is illustrated in Figure 4. The bond turnover ratio 
is defined as a measure of bond market liquidity and used to assess which bonds are the most 
liquid. The ratio is calculated as the extent of trading in the secondary market relative to the 
amount of outstanding bonds. The higher the turnover ratio, the higher the liquidity in the 
secondary bond market.  
Government bonds account for 90% of the JSE’s market liquidity. The R157 and R186 are the 
most traded bonds in the JSE listed debt market. They respectively generated turnover ratios of 
69 times and 31 times. These bonds are highly liquid as they are used by the market as 
benchmarks. Market liquidity remains relatively low in the corporate bond market as compared 
to the government bond market due to the buy and hold approach by investors but issuance is 
steadily growing. The municipal bonds market is still in the infancy stage. Its development will 
add to the breadth and depth of the bond market. (Guma, 2007). 
2.2.4 Foreign investment  
Foreign participation in the South African Bond market is still at historic heights despite 
speculation that US Federal Reserve Bank may raise interest rates in 2014. The rise in foreign 
participation was ignited by the US Federal Reserve Bank QE programme, which resulted in the 
investor seeking high yield investments in emerging markets. Foreign investors have subscribed 
for 37.2% of government bonds in the first quarter of 2014, which is up from the approximate 
12.8% in 2008. The South African bond market did experience a decline in bond purchases due 
to uncertainty around the US monetary policy. 
2.2.5 Maturity 
African firms prefer to use short term debt funding to finance their investment activity. Long 
term debt ratio range for African countries is between 12%-17% whereas developed countries 
are in the range of 28% - 48%. (Gwatidzo and Ojah, 2009). Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) offered 
plausible reasons for why African countries don’t use asset as collateral to secure long term 
loans: Banks are not accepting assets as effective collateral, the correct market values of the 
assets can’t be determined due to poor African secondary markets for these assets, problems with 
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the enforceability of the loan contracts, the most likely reason is that the African countries 
mainly use short term debt funding to finance activities.  
 
3. Literature Review 
3.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Market efficiency is the cornerstone of any well function capital market as it allows the capital 
market to fulfill its primary function of optimally allocating financial resources and diversifying 
financial risk. Fama (1970) defined an efficient market as a market in which security prices at 
any time “fully reflect” all available information. Fama (1970) describes security prices that fully 
reflect all available information as being market equilibrium prices. Market equilibrium prices 
are determined in terms of expected returns model theories. Therefore, all available information 
is fully utilized when ascertaining expected returns (Fama, 1970). The consequence of an 
efficient market is that investors in search of abnormal returns within capital markets will not 
consistently “beat” expected returns over long periods of time from using available information 
that has been disseminated to the capital markets.  
The level of efficiency of a capital market depends on the ability of security prices to fully 
absorb three subsets of available information (Fama, 1970). Harry Roberts (1967) in his 
unpublished work was the first to make the distinction between weak form and strong form. 
Fama (1970) in his definitive review of the market efficiency classified the three subsets of 
information as (1) weak form, (2) semi-strong form and (3) strong form. Fama (1970) stated 
conditions sufficient for market efficiency but not necessary as they are not reflective of markets 
in practice as being: (1) no transaction costs in trading securities (such as taxes) (2) information 
is freely available to all investors and (3) all investors agree on the implications of current 
information on current security prices and future price distributions of securities.  
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3.2 Brief historical Background 
The study on efficient market hypothesis over the past several decades has largely concerned 
itself with whether prices “fully reflect” the three subsets of available information. The initial 
studies of efficient market hypothesis focused on the first subset, weak form, which is that all 
security prices fully reflect past information. The results of weak form have been vastly 
supported by the random walk model. The random walk model is based on two hypotheses; 
firstly current prices that fully reflect all available information imply that successive price 
changes are independent. This means previous knowledge of the sequence of price changes 
leading up to the time period, t is of no help in predicting the price change during the next 
period. Secondly, successive price changes are identically distributed. (Fama, 1970). 
The initial work of random walk theory largely ignored for half a century was performed 
Bachelier (1900) as part of his doctoral thesis. Bachelier concluded that commodity prices 
exhibit random fluctuation. Bachelier’s findings were later reaffirmed by several researchers 
(Kendall, 1953; Roberts 1959; Osborne, 1959). Kendall (1953) observed that “in series of prices 
which are observed at fairly close intervals the random changes from one term to the next are so 
large as to swamp any systematic effect which may be present. The data behave almost like 
wandering series.”  Roberts (1959) demonstrated that a randomly generated time series was 
similar to actual stock prices. Osborne (1959) documented in his findings that commodity prices 
in the US follow Brownian motion. Brownian motion is the random movement of a molecule 
caused by collisions with surrounding molecules.  These findings imply that technical analysis is 
futile in trying to generate abnormal returns from past returns. 
In the mid 1960s, autocorrelation started to creep into the validity of the random walk model. 
Fama (1965) discussed two main statistical tests of autocorrelation in the price data: (1) serial 
correlation model and (2) theory of runs. Serial correlation coefficient is a measure of the 
relationship between the value of the random variable in time period, t, and its value π periods 
earlier. Price changes will be independent of each other if the serial correlation co-efficient of the 
sample is close to its true value zero (Fama, 1965). The second major statistical test is the run 
tests. A run is a sequence of price changes of the same sign. A run ends when there is a change in 
sign in the sequence of price changes. Fama (1965) briefly discusses two of the shortcomings of 
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the serial correlation and run tests. The first short coming is that the tests are too simplistic for 
chartists to be able identify if the past returns can be used to generate excess returns. A more 
sophisticated test used by chartist is the Alexander Filter Trading Rules. The next shortcoming 
discussed by Fama (1965) is that the tests only identify dependence under special circumstances.  
The early autocorrelation tests were concerned with the seasonality of stock returns. Seminal 
empirical studies found that daily, weekly and monthly returns can be predicted from past returns 
(Fama, 1965; Lo and Mackinlay, 1988; Fisher, 1966). Lo and Mackinlay (1988), also observed 
that autocorrelation in weekly returns was strongly exhibited by small stocks. Rozeff and Kinney 
(1976) were the first to observe unusually high returns in January, known as the January effect. 
Keim (1983) expanded on the findings of Rozeff and Kinney (1976). Keim (1983) observed that 
the January effect was the most prominent in small stocks from 1963 to 1979. Keim (1983) 
reported that a significant portion of the size effect can be attributed to the January month. 
Secondly that the January effect occurs mainly during the first week of trading.  
The tax loss selling hypothesis attempts to explain the relationship between the small firms and 
the January effect (Roll, 1983; Reinganum, 1983). The hypothesis states that tax laws generally 
influence investors’ portfolio decisions to sell securities that have experienced recent price 
declines so that the capital loss can be offset against taxable income. Small firm stocks are 
usually sold off for tax purposes as their stock prices are exposed to high volatility hence likely 
to incur capital losses from large price declines. It’s important to note that the tax-loss hypothesis 
relies on the assumption that investors wait until the tax year-end to sell their “loser” stocks.  The 
heavy selling of “loser” small stocks during the year end tax period depresses the prices of small 
firm stocks. After the tax year-end, the price pressure disappears and prices rise to equilibrium 
prices therefore small firm stocks display large returns at the beginning of the new tax year. A 
Monday effect was observed by French (1980), where Monday returns were significantly higher 
than the returns in other week days. Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) observed a monthly effect at 
the turn of the month. In the early 1990s Arial (1990) identified high returns around holidays.  
Another phenomenon in contradiction with the random walk model is long run mean reversal. 
Fama and French (1988a) found that 25- 40% of variations over the long run can be predicted in 
terms of negative serial correlation with past returns. 
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Semi strong form is security prices that fully reflect both past and current information available. 
There exists a burgeoning event study industry examining semi – strong form in capital markets. 
Event studies are tests used to measure how quickly security prices are able to fully reflect new 
public information.  
The pioneering event studies were performed by Fama, Jensen and Roll (1969) on the reaction of 
the stock returns to stock split announcements and Ball and Brown (1968) on the reaction of 
stock markets to earnings announcements. The Fama, Jensen and Roll (1969) found that 
abnormal returns can’t be obtained from purchasing split securities after the split is announced as 
it’s a multiplication of number of shares held by the shareholders and not a source of new 
information. Increased returns may possibly be obtained, if investors using superior information 
or having the gift of analytical talents are able to predict which securities will experience 
increased dividends post the split announcement (Fama Jensen and Roll, 1969; Fama, 1970). Ball 
and Brown (1968) concluded that the adjustment of stocks to unexpected earnings news is 
consistent with market efficiency. 
Strong form is security prices that fully reflect past, public and private information. Strong form 
studies attempt to identify that no individual or group of individuals in the market are able to 
generate abnormal profits from having monopolistic access to private information. (Fama, 1970).  
Two early studies show that strong form is contradictory to market reality. Firstly, Niederhoffer 
and Osbourne (1966) found that specialists in the NYSE used monopolistic access to private 
information to generate abnormal profits. Scholes (1972) found that corporate insiders have 
monopolistic access to private information not reflected in security prices. One group of market 
participants, open mutual funds, has been studied with some depth. Jensen(1968)’s now classic 
research paper on open mutual funds attempted to answer the question of fund managers having 
monopolistic access to private information that allows them to earn abnormal profits. Jensen 
(1968) found that in the period 1945 to1964, mutual fund returns after expenses are below the 
market line of the Sharpe-Lintner model. When all published expenses of the funds are added 
back, the returns on mutual funds are scattered randomly about the market line. Jensen (1968) 
concluded based on these results that mutual-fund managers do not “beat” the market. 
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3.3 Empirical studies 
Datta and Dhillion (1993)’s empirical study was unique in that it was the first to examine the 
bond market’s response to unexpected earning announcements. Prior to their study, bond market 
information efficiency studies only focused on the bond market’s response to dividends 
(Hanjinicolau and Kalay,1984; Jayaraman and Shastri, 1988) and stock repurchases (Vermelan, 
1981) and Bartov, 1991).  Datta and Dhillion (1993) tested a sample comprising only of 250 
large earnings surprises by 135 different firms extracted from the Institutional Brokers Estimate 
system (IBES) during the period of October 1984 to August 1990. At that time IBES provided 
earnings forecasts done by 2500 analysts for 3400 stocks trading on the US and Canadian stock 
exchanges.  
The relating clean corporate bond prices were extracted from the Data Resources Inc (DRI) and 
randomly cross checked for accuracy against Wall Street Journal. This raises a concern as there 
could be large pricing differences on the unchecked data, which may compromise the quality of 
the data used for the analysis. Manual adjustments for the accrued interest were made to the 
clean bond prices using Moody’s bond journal. The sample excluded firms without traded debt 
in the US exchange market, firms with no dividend or earnings news and firms with dividend 
and earnings news within five days of each other to avoid any contamination effect from 
dividend news.  
Standardized quarterly unexpected earnings (SUE) were used as a measure of unexpected 
earnings information hence avoidance of heteroscedascity that may be present in the sample. 
Datta and Dhillion (1993) included in their sample firms with an absolute value of SUE greater 
than or equal to one. This restricted the sample to large forecast errors in order to limit any noise. 
If a dividend announcement preceded the earnings, the window period was [+2 to + 30] days. 
When earnings preceded the dividend announcement, the window period was [– 29 to – 1] days. 
Datta and Dhillion (1993) used a cross sectional regression model to test for the information 
content of bond returns in relation on earning announcements: 
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SER is standardized announcement day excess returns for a non convertible bond. SUE is the 
standardized unexpected earnings being announced.SAR is the announcement day stock 
abnormal return. MKTRET is the announcement day return on a value weighted stock index from 
CRSP NYSE/AMEX file. Its controls for any market specific factors. DUMD is a dummy 
variable which takes a value of 1 if a dividend increase precedes an earnings announcement. 
SUE*DUMD it captures the effect of an earnings announcement on abnormal bond returns, 
which is preceded by dividend increase. DUMR is a dummy variable for bond rating, which 
takes a value of 1 if the bond is rated BB or below and 0 otherwise.SUE*DUMR captures the 
reaction of bond prices to unexpected earnings based on the investment grade of the bond. Datta 
and Dhillion (1993), regression attempts to capture the relationship between the standardized 
announcement day bond excess return (SER) and the standardized unexpected earnings measure 
(SUE).  
Datta and Dhillion (1993) calculated the SUE coefficient as significantly positive at the 1% level 
therefore bond returns react to earnings announcements. Datta and Dhillion (1993) also 
documented the SUE*DUMR coefficient to be significantly positive therefore the result 
suggested that unexpected earning announcements had a greater impact on low investment 
graded bonds (such as junk bonds). The SAR coefficient was also found to be significantly 
positive at the 1% level. Datta and Dhillion (1993) inferred from this latter result that bonds and 
stock returns have a symmetric reaction to unexpected earnings announcements. This inference 
was later contradicted by the findings of Easton et al (2008) and Defond and Zhang (2009), 
which will be discussed later in the review.  
Easton et al (2008)’s research provided the largest comprehensive data as compared to previous 
studies for both the short window test of [-10 to +10] days and long window test of a year. The 
long window period sample disproportionately contains large profitable firms. The results from 
the long window test may lack generalization and contain selection sample bias. (Easton et al, 
2008). The corporate bond prices for the sample were extracted from Mergent Fixed Income 
Securities Database (FISD) over a 12 month period from 1 January 1994 through to 31 
December 2004. Mergent FISD is a superior database as it has data over a longer period whereas 
as Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) has bond data for the period 2005 to 2006. 
TRACE is a mandatory reporting system initiated by the National Association of Security 
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Dealers that disseminates real-time transactions and price data for corporate bond trades. (Easton 
et al, 2008).  Mergent FISD reports only on US insurance companies invested in exchange traded 
bonds. This limitation on the data may imply that their results on insurance companies can’t be 
extended to other sectors if the market behavior of insurance companies is systematically 
different to other sectors. This may be a possibility due to the burdensome regulatory capital 
requirements around insurance companies (Easton et al, 2008). Easton et al (2008), provided 
mitigation against the sample selection bias. They explained that US insurance companies were 
about 30% to 40% of outstanding traded bonds therefore US insurance companies 
comprehensively represented the market behavior of the outstanding traded bond population. 
Another concern noted in the disproportionate sample was bond price bias.  Easton et al (2008) 
motivated that the competitive pricing in the market mitigated any bias in the sample bond 
prices. The analyst forecast errors data was collected from IBES and apportioned into negative 
and positive earnings news. Easton et al (2008) tested the information content of quarterly (short 
window period) earnings and annual earnings (long window period) using the following 
regression model: 
      (eq.1) 
Rijt denotes the adjusted bond return from time t-1 to t for the jth bond issued by firm i, EAit is 
an earnings metric of firm i from time t-1 to t; MVFit-1 denotes our proxy for firm i’s market 
value at time t-1.  Easton et al (2008), uses to two different measures of the earnings metric: (1) 
seasonal differences in quarterly earnings and (2) analyst forecast errors. The earning metric is 
deflated by the firm’s market value.  
Easton et al (2008) found that both seasonal differences in earnings and analyst forecast errors 
over short and long window produced similar results. They estimated the coefficient on negative 
earnings changes as being significantly larger than the coefficient on positive earnings changes. 
They observed that the coefficient on unexpected earnings news reported by firms with 
speculative-grade bonds was significantly larger than the coefficient on unexpected earnings 
news reported by firms with investment grade bonds. Easton et al (2008) concluded from their 
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observations that bonds are more sensitive to bad unexpected earnings news and more so in 
speculative bonds. They justified their results using the non linear bond payoff structure 
hypothesis. (Easton et al, 2008). The non linearity of bond payoff results in limited upside in 
bond returns as bondholders will not be able to partake in any increase in the firm’s future cash 
flows as their claim on the firm’s future cash flows is fixed. The downside is greater than the 
upside but the loss is also limited to the initial investment. (Easton et al, 2008; Defond and 
Zhang, 2009). The asymmetric reaction of the bonds to unexpected earnings news is in direct 
contradiction with the findings of Datta and Dhillion (1993), who found that bonds have a 
symmetric reaction to unexpected earnings news. 
Easton et al (2008) also tested for increases in bond trading post the earnings announcements. 
They observed that trading peaked two days after the announcement date. Easton et al (2008) 
noted in their findings that the bonds included in the sample may have a liquidity discount. The 
liquidity discount may have confounded the short window results. They tried to mitigate the 
liquidity discount by testing a long window period because in the long run the discount will 
disappear due to healthy competition between dealers. In the latter part of their research Easton 
et al (2008) further noted sample selection concerns and mitigations such as measurement errors 
and double counting. Easton et al (2008) used the bond trade size data from Mergent FISD to 
calculate the bond trade volumes. Easton et al (2008) highlighted measurement errors in their 
calculated trading volumes: (1) transaction costs are included in the trade size therefore the trade 
volumes have positive bias (2) trades between insurances companies are reported as two separate 
trades in Mergent FISD and not as one trade. Easton et al (2008) deleted one trade to avoid 
double counting in the traded volumes.  
Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) were the first to test the informational efficiency of corporate bonds 
returns at both a daily and intraday level using actively traded high yield bonds over a short 
horizon. Previously intraday behavior of bond returns was only tested in government bonds using 
economic news (Fleming and Remolona, 1997; Nyborg and Sundaresan, 1996; Balduzzi, Elton 
and Green, 2001).  Fifty five active high yielding bonds were extracted from the Fixed Income 
Pricing System (FIPS) over a 9 month period of 3 January 1995 and 1 October 1995. FIPS 
captures bond prices, volumes, and transactions for limited number of high yield bonds based on 
liquidity.  
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Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) selected to test 34 of the 55 FIPS bonds using two cross sectional 
regression model at the daily and intraday level in order to see if an earnings announcement 
reaction is reflected in stocks or bond returns: 
(eq.2) 
The log of forecast errors is used as a proxy for unexpected earnings news. Hotchkiss and Ronen 
(2002) calculated the bond returns using the midpoint price. Stock returns were calculated using 
the last transaction price. They noted that the differences in the calculation of bonds returns and 
stocks returns might bias the results to stocks adjusting to earnings news quicker than bonds.  
The regressions were carried out using two set of window periods period, first window period is 
[0 to 7] days for daily data and [0 to +14] days for intra daily data respectively. Second window 
period is [-1 to + 4] days for daily data and [-1 to + 13] for intra data respectively. In the first 
window period, the daily bond returns were significantly positively related to forecast earnings 
errors at +1. The coefficient remains significantly positive as the window period is increased, but 
the magnitude of the coefficient drops at +7. Similarly, daily stock returns were also significantly 
positive as the first window period was increased. In the second window period, daily returns 
were only significant positively to earnings forecast errors in the interval [-1 to 0], thereafter 
daily returns were insignificantly related to forecast earning errors. Daily stock returns were only 
significantly positive until the end of the announcement date, [0 to +1].  
The intra returns were significantly positive from the hour post the earning announcements in the 
interval [-1 to + 1] until interval [-1 to + 14] in the first window period. Earnings news was fully 
absorbed into intra daily bond returns by the fourth hour. Intra daily stock returns were 
significantly positive for through both window periods. Earning news was incorporated into intra 
daily stock returns by the seventh hour. Stock returns took slightly longer than bond returns to 
absorb the earning news, but most of the information is absorbed in the stock returns in the first 
hour.  
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Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) concluded in their findings that any new firm specific information 
was quickly impounded into both daily and intra daily bonds returns. They also concluded that 
bond returns are just as information efficient as stock returns hence stock returns don’t lead bond 
returns. The latter conclusion contradicts the findings of Kwan (1996) who argued that the 
individual stocks lead bonds in incorporating firm specific information, based on the explanatory 
power of lagged stock returns on current bond yields. In other words, stocks reflect information 
about the firm’s assets more quickly thus a predictive power for future bond returns. Low 
frequency data may result in researchers concluding extreme information inefficiencies in the 
bond market. Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) using active trades may have had the advantage of 
minimizing false conclusions arising from low frequency data. The 55 high yield bonds extracted 
from FIPS may not have been reflective of the market behavior of the larger bond population in 
the US therefore the results from the sample may lack generality. 
4. Main hypothesis 
The main hypothesis is based on the asymmetrical bond payoff structure discussed by Easton et 
al (2008). Bonds have a limited upside as the bondholders will not be able to participate in an 
increase in the firm’s future cash flows because they have a fixed claim on the firm’s future cash 
flows. The downside is relatively greater than the upside but the loss is limited to the initial 
investment of the bondholders.  
Unexpected earnings news is a new source of information about the firm’s future cash flows. 
Good unexpected earnings news is an indication of future growth in the firm’s future cash flows, 
whereas bad unexpected earnings news may be signaling to market that the firm is undergoing 
future cash flow problems.  Based on the asymmetrical nature of the bond payoff, bondholders 
will react more sensitively to bad unexpected earnings news than good unexpected earning news 
due to risk of losing their entire investment. This implies that the relationship between 
unexpected good earnings news and bond returns will be weak irrespective of how large the 
good unexpected earnings news due to the bondholders’ fixed claim on cash flows. Bad 
unexpected earning news will lead to adjustment of bondholders’ expectation of future coupons 
payments. A strong positive relationship between bond returns and bad unexpected earnings 
news is therefore predicted. 
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Stocks are also representative of a claim to firm’s future cash flows therefore the stock market 
will also react to unexpected earnings news (Ball and Brown, 1968). This gives rise to the 
question of whether stocks lead corporate bond in incorporating unexpected earnings news in 
prices due to illiquidity and lack of infrastructure in the corporate bond market. Corporate bonds 
are less liquid than stock markets due to the buy and hold investment approach of market 
participants and low price volatility (Easton et al, 2008), therefore price formation process in 
corporate bonds may be hindered. The lack of adequate infrastructure in the corporate bond 
market infringes on the transparency of the market. The lack of transparency may disrupt the 
informational efficiency of the corporate bond market.  
The benefit of transparency in the corporate market is that there will be less adverse investment 
selections, encourage uniformed investors to enter the market therefore increased improvement 
in the price formation process (Hotchkiss and Ronen, 2002). The impact of illiquidity and 
infrastructure on information efficiency in the corporate bond market will be tested by examining 
if both bonds and stock respond to unexpected earnings news over the window period.  If stocks 
do lead bonds in adjusting to unexpected earnings news this implies that bond market regulators 
need to make a concerted effort to deepen market liquidity and implement adequate 
infrastructure to improve transparency. 
4.1 Research design 
4.1.1 Sample 
The secondary market bonds issued by the four major commercial banks were imported from 
Bloomberg for the period between 1 January 2013 and 31 December 2014. The four major banks 
by market value are Standard Bank Group Ltd, First Rand Ltd, Barclays Africa Group Ltd 
(formerly known as ABSA Group Ltd) and Nedbank Group Ltd. The initial sample extracted 
was 912 traded corporate bonds on the JSE Debt Market. The bond specific information such 
bond issue size, bond capital outstanding, coupon rate, floating rate or fixed rate, issue date, 
maturity date, issuer name, currency, other bond characteristics were obtained from Thomson 
Reuters (see appendix A1).  
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We eliminate any bonds for which the earnings announcements preceded or succeeded a 
significant event. Bonds with a maturity of less than one year as at 31 December 2014 are 
excluded from the sample. Bonds with a maturity of less than one year tend to behave like 
money market instruments (JSE) and also have small price changes (Ederington et al, 2012). 
Foreign currency bonds, bonds with variable rates, callable bonds, convertible bonds or any other 
special features are also eliminated from the sample. Special features are excluded as they affect 
the value of the bond. Zero coupon bonds are also eliminated from the sample as they tend to 
behave like stocks (Bessembinder et al, 2009). After elimination of bonds with special features, 
zero coupon bonds and a maturity of less than a year the sample reduced to 42 traded bonds.  
Corporate bonds tend to trade infrequently due to the buy and hold investment approach of 
market participants. The infrequently traded bonds may be become more active during the 
earnings announcement period due to earnings surprises (Hotchkiss and Ronen, 2002), therefore, 
all non convertible, fixed rate, locally denominated bonds (i.e. conventional or vanilla bonds) 
issued by the four major commercial banks both liquid and illiquid are included in the testing 
sample.  A concern of sample selection bias in our sample may be raised as we only selected 
corporate bonds from the four major commercial banks. This may suggest that the generality of 
the results is reduced.  The sample selection bias may be mitigated because South African 
commercial banks are the largest issuers of corporate bonds in South African market. There are 
currently over 1500 bonds listed on the JSE Debt Market (JSE). Commercial banks currently 
have in issue approximately 912 listed corporate bonds as at 31 December 2014, which is 
approximately 61% of outstanding corporate bonds in the JSE Debt Market (See author 
calculation in appendix, A1). Commercial bank issued corporate bonds are therefore a good 
representative of the market behavior in the South African corporate bond market. 
4.1.2 Earnings announcement 
Earnings announcement or news is when the directors of a listed company release the firm’s 
actual performance results for a period of time (quarterly, semi annually and year end results) to 
the financial markets as per the exchange disclosure rules. Unexpected earnings news or forecast 
errors is the difference between market expectations made public (e.g. analysts) before the 
 	 Page	23	 		 	
announcement date and actual earnings. This is the component of the earnings news that is 
digested by the market and reflected into asset prices.  
The earnings announcement dates for each commercial bank in South Africa were traced to the 
Stock Exchange News Service (SENS) announcements posted on their respective commercial 
bank websites. Sixteen earnings announcements were identified in the analysis period (see 
appendix, A2 and A3). The SENS is a JSE news service that provides the user with access to 
company announcements such as mergers take-over, rights offers, capital issues and cautionary, 
which have a direct impact on the markets.  
The four major South African commercial banks traditionally release earnings SENS 
announcements for semiannual and full year end earnings. Therefore, semi-annual and full year 
end reported earnings will be extracted from Bloomberg. Unexpected earning news will be 
parted into good unexpected earnings news and bad unexpected earnings news. Negative forecast 
errors will be used as a proxy of bad unexpected earnings news. Positive forecast errors will be a 
proxy of good unexpected earnings news. Median analyst forecast earnings will be used as a 
proxy for market expected returns as they are reflective of all currently available information in 
the market. Analyst forecast earnings will be obtained from Bloomberg. Forecast errors will be 
computed as follows: 
Forecast error (FE) = Actual Earnings (AE) – Analyst Forecast (AF) 
 Analyst Forecast (AF)      (eq. 3) 
4.1.3 Calculation of daily bond and stock returns 
The daily last prices were extracted for the period between 1 January 2013 and 31 December 
2014.The dirty price for bonds is defined as the clean price plus accrued interest since the last 
coupon payment. Most researchers typically use the dirty price as it’s the price received or paid 
by the bond traders (Ederington et al, 2012). The use of clean prices can be disadvantageous 
because returns based on the clean price don’t reflect the full return as they exclude interest 
accrued but in short window tests this disadvantage is insignificant (Ederington et al, 2012). Non 
trading day(s) are assumed to take the price of the trading day prior to the non trading day(s). 
The corporate bond daily returns can be computed in two ways. 
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Simple returns: 
BR = BP (t) –BP (t-1) 
 BP (t-1)          (eq. 4) 
 
BR       –   Daily corporate bond return 
BP (t)–   Prior day’s corporate bond price 
BP (t-1)–Today’s corporate bond price 
 
Log returns or continuously compounding returns: 
Ln (BR) = ln (BPt) – ln (BPt-1)         (eq. 5) 
Ln (BR)–   Log of daily corporate bond return 
Ln (BPt) –Log of prior’s day corporate bond price 
Ln (BPt-1) –Log of today’s corporate bond price 
 
We will employ log returns in our analysis as academic literature generally uses log returns as it 
has three attractive properties. Firstly, log returns can be interpreted as continuously 
compounded returns thus returns across different assets can be compared. Secondly, 
continuously compounding returns are time additive. Thirdly bonds are characterized with 
heteroscedasticity (Ederington et al, 2012) therefore logs have the effect of rescaling the data to 
pull in extreme observation. The last daily stock prices for the four commercial banks were 
retrieved from Bloomberg for the same analysis period. The stock log returns are computed as 
follows: 
Ln (SR) = ln (SPt) –ln (SPt-1)        (eq. 6) 
Ln (SR)–   Log of daily stock return 
Ln (SPt)–   Log of prior’s day stock price 
Ln (SPt-1) –Log of today’s stock price 
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4.1.4 Abnormal returns 
Abnormal or unexpected return is defined as the difference between actual return less the return 
expected by the market. The daily abnormal return for each bond or stock in the sample will be 
calculated separately. The abnormal bond return can be measured using three different models: 
(1) mean adjusted model, (2) matching portfolio or (3) factor models (Bessembinder et al, 2009). 
The mean adjusted model which accounts for term structure changes is the most frequently used 
model for calculating abnormal returns. The abnormal return in terms of the mean adjusted 
model is the actual bond return less the return on the matching Treasury bond with similar time 
to maturity and coupons. The second measurement uses a matching portfolio as a proxy of 
expected returns. The matching portfolio may be a bond index on the exchange or a benchmark 
portfolio can be developed to better match bonds based on default risk and time to maturity risk. 
The benchmark portfolio is weighted either using equal weighted or value weighted returns 
(Bessembinder et al, 2009). The third model is the five factor model developed by Fama and 
French(1993), which is an extension of the three factor model used to measure stock returns. The 
five factor model includes the treasury yield curve slope and default premium. In our study the 
matching portfolio model will be used to measure the abnormal bond returns.  
The All Bond Index (ALBI) will be used as a proxy of market expected return in the corporate 
bond market. The ALBI is generally used by South African fund managers as a benchmark to 
assess the performance of bond portfolios. The ALBI is a vanilla bond index comprising of 20 
government and non government bonds ranked by both liquidity and market capitalisation. Non 
government bonds comprise of municipalities, state entities and corporate bonds. The 
contribution of each bond to the index’s total return is weighted according to the par value in 
issue (JSE).The daily abnormal bond return will be the difference between the actual daily 
corporate bond return less the daily return on the ALBI. The financial sector index (FINI) will be 
used to as a proxy for the expected market return on commercial bank stocks. The daily 
abnormal stock return is the difference between the actual return less the daily return on the 
FINI. 
Event studies use both standardized and unstandardised abnormal returns. Standardised abnormal 
returns are abnormal returns standardised by their estimated return volatility. The estimated 
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return volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the abnormal return (Ederington et al, 
2012). Past researchers have compared the power tests of standardized and unstandardised 
returns. Kothari and Warner (2006) found that a test using standardized abnormal returns is in 
principle superior under certain conditions, especially in short-horizon event studies, but it 
typically makes little difference outside of these conditions in comparison to unstandardised 
abnormal returns. Information efficient studies have mainly used unstandardised returns 
(Hotchkiss and Ronen, 2002; Easton et al, 2008; Defond and Zhang, 2009). Similarly in our 
study unstandardised returns will be used to test for information efficiency in South African 
Corporate Bonds. The unstandardised abnormal return for both bonds and stocks is calculated as 
follows: 
Abnormal bond return (ABR) = Log bond Returns (BR) – All Bond Index Return (ALBI) (eq. 7) 
Abnormal stock return (ASR) = Log stock Returns (SR) – Financial services Index (FINI) (eq. 8) 
4.1. 5 Firm average returns 
Once we have calculated the abnormal bond return for each bond (or stock) within the sample we 
used the abnormal bond (stock) returns to determine the firm average abnormal bond 
(stock)return for each short window period. There are three methods of calculating the firm 
average abnormal bond return. The same method will be applied to the abnormal stock returns 
First method, each abnormal bond (stock) return is treated as a separate observation known as the 
bond level approach (Narayanan and Shastri,1988). The problem with the bond level approach is 
the sample will be biased toward large firms as they tend to have multiple bonds. Secondly, it 
violates the assumption that returns are independent as the returns on different bonds of the same 
firm are correlated. This results in the standard deviation of the sample lowering and biasing the 
t-statistic upwards (Bessembinder et al, 2009).  
The second method is the representative bond approach. A representative bond for each firm 
from the sample is selected. The representative bond (stock) may not clearly capture the value 
change in the firm’s listed debt and may possibly also bias the results. For example, certain 
events may have a significant impact on bonds with the long time to maturity hence the 
representative bond(stock) may overstate the firm return’s reaction to unexpected earnings news 
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(Bessembinder et al, 2009). The third method and the more preferred approach for our analysis is 
the firm level approach. The firm level return is all the abnormal bond (stock)returns in each 
short window period are weighted using the outstanding bond capital of the relating issuing firm, 
therefore resulting in a firm level return within each short window period (Bessembinder et al, 
2009). The firm level approach is the preferred method for two reasons. Firstly, it’s not exposed 
to firm cross correlation. Secondly, it’s a good representative of the firm value changes arising 
from a corporate event.  
4.1.6 Window period 
Window period is the period of time around the event occurrence. A long window may raise the 
power of the test for two reasons (1) the number of event days for which the returns are 
calculable raises the power test but at a decreasing rate 2) the larger number of trades before and 
after earning announcement day (t) averages out some of the noise in individual bond trade 
prices but the downside of a longer window period is that the test power may be reduced since 
returns over longer windows include more non-event noise that can’t be averaged out 
(Ederington et al, 2012). The window period of four days [0, +4] has been used in the analysis in 
order to capture the strength of the power test and avoid any non event noise. 0 is the earnings 
announcement date (t). In the analysis we increased the window period from [0, +1] until the [0, 
+4] to see if the impact of earning news is fully incorporated at 0or it takes longer to incorporate 
the unexpected earnings news. The firm level returns over the four day short window period 
were converted into an average daily short window return in order to test the strength of the 
coefficient as we increased the window period (Easton et al, 2008). 
4.1.7 Cross sectional regression 
Cross sectional regression has been used in past research to determine the relationship between 
bond returns and earnings announcements (Hotchkiss and Ronen, 2002; Easton et al, 2008; 
Defond and Zhang, 2009). A cross sectional regression will also be used in our analysis in order 
to capture the reaction of South African daily corporate bond returns in relation to unexpected 
earnings announcements of South African companies over a short window period: 
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Abnormal Bond Returns (ABR) = ∝ ൅	ࢇ ∗ ࡲ࢕࢘ࢋࢉࢇ࢙࢚ࡱ࢘࢘࢕࢘ሺࡲࡱሻ ൅ ࢈ ∗ࡹࢇ࢘࢑ࢋ࢚ࡾࢋ࢚࢛࢘࢔࢙ሺࡹࡾሻ ൅ ࢉ ∗
ࡰࡰࢁࡹ൅ ࢋ(eq. 9) 
ABR is the cumulative abnormal bond returns for the four day short window periods over the 
analysis period. Market returns (MR) represented by the index return of FTSE/JSE Top 40is 
included in the regression to account for any market specific movements over the short window 
period. The FTSE/JSE Top 40 Index consists of the largest 40 companies ranked by full market 
value (JSE). The index was designed to represent the performance of South African companies. 
The index also provides investors with a comprehensive and complementary set of indices, 
which measures the performance of the major capital and industry segments of the South African 
market (JSE). DDUM is the dividend dummy variable. An interim and final dividend is 
announced on each earnings SENS announcement by the commercial banks. The interim and 
final dividend is increased at each earning SENS announcements. A dividend announcement is 
also a source of new information that will impact bond prices as it’s a signal to the bondholder 
that either the firm future cash flows will be sufficient to service their debt or outflow of cash to 
finance the dividend may impinge on their right to debt repayments (Ederington et al, 2012).    
The dummy variable is included in the cross section regression in order to capture the effect of 
the dividend increase on each earnings announcement in order not to contaminate the results. 
The dummy variable will take on the value of 1 if there is a dividend increase on earnings 
announcement day otherwise a value of 0. The stock returns will also be regressed over the same 
short window period in order to analyse if stock returns lead bond returns incorporating 
unexpected earnings announcements: 
Abnormal Stock Returns (ASR) = ∝ ൅	ࢇ ∗ ࡲ࢕࢘ࢋࢉࢇ࢙࢚ࡱ࢘࢘࢕࢘ሺࡲࡱሻ ൅ ࢈ ∗ ࡹࢇ࢘࢑ࢋ࢚ࡾࢋ࢚࢛࢘࢔࢙ሺࡹࡾሻ ൅
ࢋ(eq. 10) 
ASR is the cumulative abnormal stock return for the four day short window period over the 
analysis period. The remaining variables are the same inputs as used in the bond cross sectional 
regression. 
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4.1.8 Descriptive statistics 
4.1.8.1 Descriptive statistic on issuer characteristics 
 
Table one provides the issuer characteristics. Public borrowers are large, more profitable, have a 
higher credit rating, less likely to experience financial difficulties, have projects with low 
liquidation values, and have a longer operating history, than firms that rely on private debt (Ojah 
and Pillay, 2009). The South African commercial banks are in line with this characteristics as 
they are fairly large at median market capitalisation of approximately R198 billion, well 
established  and profitable though they are less efficient than other countries (Andrianaivo and 
Yartey, 2010) with a median cost efficiency of 55.46% (total cost to total income). 
The median book value is approximately R 85 million, which is 1.80 times the median market 
capitalisation meaning South African commercial banks are creating wealth for shareholders 
(market capitalization to book value). The South African commercial banks are well capitalized 
in order to absorb financial shocks. The median Tier 1 capital ratio is 12.80%; this is above the 
minimum regulatory requirement of 6% of Risk Weighted Assets (RWA).The median total risk 
based capital is 15.05%, which is above the minimum regulatory requirement of 8% of RWA. 
The capital adequacy measure is consistent with the findings of Andrianaivo and Yartey, (2010) 
who found an average of 16% of RWA. 
 
 
 
Table 1
Bond issuers Characteristics as at 31 December 2014
Firm fundamentals
Median market value  198,004,040,030         
Median tier 1 Capital ratio 12.80%
Median total risk based capital ratio 15.05%
Median efficiency ratio 55.46%
Median total Loans 694,489,500,000         
Median total deposits 727,574,000,000         
Median total Assets 984,981,000,000         
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4.1.8.2 Descriptive statistics on bond and stock characteristics 
 
Table two briefly provides the characteristics of bonds and stocks. The total outstanding bond 
issue of the sample is approximately R 33.7 billion with the median outstanding bond issue in the 
sample being approximately R434.8m. The sample has a median issue date and maturity date of 
28 March 2012 and 24 April 2019 hence corporate bonds in South Africa generally have a 
median bond term of seven years. This is in line with Gwatizo and Ojah (2009)’s observation of 
the African debt market having short term maturities. The mean and median of abnormal bond 
returns is -0.00082614 or -0.0020494 respectively. The mean and median of abnormal stock 
returns is -0.00077278 and 0.0077434 respectively.  
The standard deviation of abnormal returns is 0.0032588 and 0.029329 for bonds and stocks 
respectively. This means stocks have more volatility than bonds around earnings announcement 
day .It is expected that stocks will be more volatile than bonds because bonds are ranked higher 
than stocks in the liquidation process. Bonds are ranked higher due to debt covenants being 
stipulated in agreements and collateral pledged to protect bondholders. The high volatility in 
stock returns is consistent with the high median stock returns i.e. higher volatility (risk) comes 
with higher reward. Normally distributed returns must have a skewness of zero and kurtosis of 3 
(excess kurtosis must be zero).  
Skewness is defined as a measure of the asymmetry of a probability distribution about the mean. 
In statistical terms a skewness of zero means the data is symmetrical about the mean of the 
distribution. Positive skewness means that the distribution has a long tail to the right hence 
distribution lies more to the left of the mean. Positive skewness in financial returns is interpreted 
Table 2
Summary of bond and stock characteristics
Bonds Stocks
Total outstanding capital 33,652,759,832    Mean abnormal returns                  (0.000773)             
Median bond issue 434,800,000          Median  abnormal returns                0.007743              
Mean abnormal returns              (0.000826)              Standard deviation  abnormal returns      0.029329              
Median abnormal returns                 (0.002049)              Skewness abnormal returns                   (1.233800)             
Standard deviation abnormal returns        0.003259               Ex. kurtosis   abnormal returns             0.875280              
Skewness abnormal returns                    0.931920              
Ex. kurtosis  abnormal returns           (0.335770)             
Median issue date 3/28/2012
Median maturity date 4/24/2019
Median maturity term 7.08
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by investors as asset returns being more susceptible to large positive shocks than large negative 
shocks. Negative skewness means a long left tail hence the distribution lies mainly to the right of 
the mean. Investors interpret negative skewness as asset prices being more susceptible to large 
negative shocks than large positive shocks. 
The abnormal bond returns in the sample have a negative skewness of -0.33577 meaning the 
South African corporate bond market is more likely to experience large negative shocks than 
large positive shocks. In recent years, the South African bond market has been adversely affected 
by increasing interest rate shocks, rising inflation shocks and global shocks amid slow growth. In 
particular, 2013 was characterized by bouts of volatility when the US Federal Bank in May 
unexpectedly indicated that it intended to reduce quantitative easing (QE). This resulted in a 
massive global sell off of risky assets in emerging markets.  In December 2013, the US Fed 
confirmed a reduction in QE of $10 billion. This led to the weakening of the rand due to the 
emerging market currencies sell offs. To combat the inflation impact from the weaker rand, the 
South African Reserve Bank increased interest rate by 50 basis points since 2008 (Management 
debt report, 2014).  
Kurtosis looks at the peak level of the probability distribution about the mean. Normally 
distributed returns have a kurtosis of three meaning the probability distribution will have a 
mesokurtic peak. If the probability distribution has negative excess kurtosis, the peak will be 
lower and broader than a normal distribution and tails are shorter and thinner. A low and broad 
peaked probability distribution is said to be platykurtic. If the probability distribution has 
positive excess kurtosis, the peak will be higher and sharper than the peak of a normal 
distribution and tail is longer and fatter. A high and sharp peaked probability distribution is 
known as a leptokurtic distribution. The bond abnormal returns in the sample have positive 
excess kurtosis of 0.93192 and therefore will have a leptokurtic distribution. 
The stock abnormal return has a negative skewness of -1.2338 meaning financial stocks in South 
Africa are more likely to be exposed to large downside than upside. The commercial banks’ 
performances are linked to the current poor economic outlook in South Africa of slow growth, 
political infighting, sovereign downgrades, widening current deficit, volatile portfolio inflows, 
rising inflation and interest rate hikes. These economic factors put a squeeze on the commercial 
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bank margins: increased impairment provisioning, reduced loan growth due to higher borrowing 
rates incurred by consumers, and reduced trading activity in secondary market. The negative 
skewness in the stock abnormal returns is also consistent with the findings of other researchers 
(Alagidede, 2011; Jefferis and Smith, 2005) in the South African stock market. The abnormal 
stock returns have a positive excess kurtosis of 0.87528 hence abnormal stock returns have a 
leptokurtic distribution. The leptokurtic distribution in the abnormal stock returns is consistent 
with empirical stylized facts on stock returns (Fama, 1965, Jefferis and Smith, 2005).The stock 
returns descriptive statistics therefore reject the assumption that stock returns are independent 
and normally distributed.  
 
5. Bond and stock markets reaction to earnings news 
 
We firstly examine the corporate bond market’s reaction to earnings surprises (Table 3) before 
partitioning between good and bad unexpected earnings surprises. The earnings forecast error 
coefficient is -0.00633996 on the day one return [0, +1], which is significantly positively related 
to bond returns at p≤ 10%. The earnings forecast error remains significantly positive as the 
window period is increase to [0, +4].Similarly, stock returns have an earnings forecast error 
coefficient of 0.0673336, which is significantly positive at p ≤ 5%. The stock returns earnings 
forecast error coefficient remains significantly positive as the window period is increased to [0, 
+4]. The regression results in Table 3 indicate that both bonds and stock returns on average 
Table 3
Effect of earnings news on daily corporate bond returns and stock returns
Daily return 
interval
Intercept   JSE Top 40 Index
Bonds P‐ Values
[0,1] ‐0.000151 ‐0.006340 (0.0694) * 0.056548
[0,2] ‐0.001209 ‐0.050720 (0.0694) * 0.226192
[0.3] ‐0.000454 ‐0.019020 (0.0694) * 0.056548
[0,4] ‐0.000605 ‐0.025360 (0.0694) * 0.056548
Stocks
[0,1] ‐0.002386 0.067334 (0.04010) ** 0.263523
[0,2] ‐0.004771 0.134667 (0.04010) ** 0.263523
[0.3] ‐0.007157 0.202001 (0.04010) ** 0.263523
[0,4] ‐0.009543 0.269335 (0.04010) ** 0.263523
Earnings forecast
***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively
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respond to unexpected earnings news. This means that the lack of liquidity and infrastructure has 
not on average hindered the information efficiency of bonds from a daily return perspective or in 
other words there is some limited liquidity and transparency in the corporate bond market that 
allows bonds on average to be information efficient. An analysis at the intraday level similar to 
Hotchkiss and Ronen, (2002) would need to be conducted to measure the exact speed of 
adjustments in bond and stock prices to conclusively determine the impact of illiquidity and lack 
of infrastructure on the information efficiency of corporate bonds. 
 
We then partition the earnings forecast errors into good and bad unexpected earnings news in 
Table 4. The good news’ earnings forecast error coefficient is -0.00356208, which is 
insignificantly related to corporate bond returns. The coefficient remains insignificant as we 
increase the window period to [0, +4]. This observation is in line with the main hypothesis as we 
expected a weak relationship between good unexpected earnings news and corporate bond 
returns due to the fact that bondholders do not share in the firm’s increased future cash flows as 
they have a fixed claim on the firm’s future cash flows. The bad news’ earnings forecast error co 
efficient is -0.0222007, which is insignificantly related to corporate bond returns.  
The result is not in line with the main hypothesis as we expected corporate bond returns to be 
significantly related to bad unexpected earnings news due to the risk of bondholder possibly 
losing their initial investment. The main investors in the South African corporate bond market 
are institutional investors (such as pension funds and insurance companies) and banks. 
Institutional investors are required by legislation to hold a certain percentage of fixed income and 
Effect of good earnings news on daily bond and stock returns Effect of bad earnings news on daily bond and stock returns
Daily 
return 
interval
Intercept Earnings forecast JSE Top 40 Index Daily 
return 
interval
Intercept JSE Top 40 Index
Bonds P‐ Values Bonds P‐ Values
[0,1] ‐0.000322 ‐0.003562 (0.6148) 0.077311 [0,1] ‐0.000744 ‐0.022201 (0.1320) ‐0.024316
[0,2] ‐0.000643 ‐0.007124 (0.6148) 0.077311 [0,2] ‐0.001487 ‐0.044401 (0.1320) ‐0.024316
[0,3] ‐0.000965 ‐0.010686 (0.6148) 0.077311 [0,3] ‐0.002231 ‐0.066602 (0.1320) ‐0.024316
[0,4] ‐0.001287 ‐0.014248 (0.6148) 0.077311 [0,4] ‐0.002975 ‐0.088803 (0.1320) ‐0.024316
Stocks Stocks
[0,1] ‐0.002875 0.041518 (0.3341) 0.886796 [0,1] 0.007682 0.306984 (0.0459) ** 0.630765
[0,2] ‐0.005750 0.083036 (0.3341) 0.886796 [0,2] 0.015364 0.613967 (0.0459) ** 0.630765
[0,3] ‐0.008625 0.124554 (0.3341) 0.886796 [0,3] 0.023046 0.920951 (0.0459) ** 0.630765
[0,4] ‐0.011500 0.166073 (0.3341) 0.886796 [0,4] 0.030728 1.227930 (0.0459) ** 0.630765
Table 4
Earnings forecast
***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively
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also require fixed income in order to match their long term liabilities.  Banks are required by the 
South African Reserve Bank to keep a minimum of fixed income in order to meet liquidity and 
capital requirements. These requirements have created a buy and hold to maturity strategy in the 
South African bond market hence the market’s irresponsiveness to bad unexpected earnings 
news.  The small sized and infrequent issuances and lack of a secondary corporate bond market 
further incentivises investors to hold onto corporate bonds until maturity (IOSCO, 2011). 
A buy and hold to maturity strategy depresses liquidity in the corporate bond market, which in 
turn may lead to disruptions in the bond price formation process. Price formation disruptions 
may lead to information inefficiencies in the corporate bond market. Regulators may need to 
look at means of increasing the investor base to include retail investors; larger and more frequent 
issuances and implementing sophisticated secondary corporate bond market infrastructure in 
order to encourage liquidity in the corporate bond market thus further improve information 
efficiency. The reaction to good and bad unexpected earnings news indicates there is no 
asymmetric reaction to good and bad unexpected earnings news in South African corporate 
bonds as we had predicted but instead it’s symmetric. 
Similarly, we also partitioned between good and bad unexpected earning news for stock returns. 
We found that the good earning news’ earning forecast coefficient of 0.0415181 was 
insignificantly related to stock returns at the day one returns [0, +1]. The co efficient remained 
insignificant as we increased the window to [0, +4].The bad news’ earnings forecast errors 
coefficient of 0.306984 was found to be significantly positively related to stock returns at p ≤ 5% 
for the day one return [0, +1]. The coefficient increased and remained significant at the p ≤ 5% 
when the window period was increased to [0, +4].  
The response of stock returns to good and bad unexpected earnings news indicates that South 
African stock have an asymmetric reaction to good and bad earnings news. It’s generally 
expected that a negative shock is likely to cause more volatility in stock returns than a positive 
shock of the same magnitude. Asymmetry in stock returns is generally attributed to leverage 
effects. Leverage effect is when a fall in the value of a firm’s stock causes the debt-to-equity 
ratio to rise. This leads stockholders, who bear the residual risk of the firm, to perceive their 
future cash flow stream as being relatively more risky (Alagidede, 2011). The irresponsiveness 
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of the stockholders to good earnings news may also indicate that good unexpected earnings news 
has been incorporated into the returns prior to earnings announcement date.  
 
5.1 Limitation of data 
Low frequency bonds included in our data may lead to the conclusion of extreme informational 
inefficiency. Corporate bonds are less liquid than stocks therefore there is a concern that the 
prices in our sample may not be at intrinsic value. False conclusions may be drawn about the 
information efficiency of the corporate bonds due to infrequently traded bonds becoming liquid 
during the earnings announcement period. Liquidity discounts may be present in bond prices 
from investor quickly selling off their infrequently traded bonds in response to bad unexpected 
earning news. To the extent there is a positive relationship between the magnitude of the bad 
news and the size of the liquidity discount, we will observe positive relation between bond 
returns and bad unexpected earnings news that is not directly attributable to a revision in 
bondholders’ expectations about future payoffs (Easton et al, 2008). 
5.2 Robust checks 
 
4.2. Robustness Checks  
We performed robustness checks in Gretl to ensure model adequacy. The Ljung-Box statistic on 
the OLS model in A5 (appendix) finds that there is no evidence of autocorrelation in the time 
series. A model is said to have an ARCH effect if the variance of errors changes over time rather 
than systematically with one of the explanatory variable. The ARCH (7) test in table A4 
(appendix) indicates that there is no evidence of conditional heteroscedasticity in the model. 
These robust checks imply that the model is adequate. 
 
 
 
 	 Page	36	 		 	
5.3 Conclusion 
Using a 42 corporate bond sample selected from the four major commercial banks in South 
Africa, we analysed the information efficiency of the corporate bond market in South Africa in 
relation to earnings announcements of South Africa companies. We also examined if the lack of 
infrastructure and illiquidity in the corporate bond market slows down its information efficiency 
relative to the stock market. We found that on average both corporate bonds and stocks 
incorporate any new information in earnings announcements over a four day window period. We 
also observed that corporate bonds are insensitive to both good and bad unexpected earnings 
news. This insensitivity affirms a buy and hold strategy in the South African corporate bond 
market, which is currently undermining liquidity in the market. Regulators would do well to 
encourage retail investor participation; larger and more frequent issuances and implement 
sophisticated secondary market infrastructure in order to encourage liquidity in the corporate 
bond market therefore further improve information efficiency. We saw that stock returns have an 
asymmetric reaction to good and bad unexpected earnings news, which is consistent with the 
behavior of other African stock returns. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Issuer Maturity date Outstanding capital Issue size Rate Country Currency Issue date Type
SBAEI 11.4200 
07‐Jul‐16 MTN 07‐Jul‐2016 750,000,000 750,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 07-Jul-2009 Bond
SBAEI 8.2500 
15‐Sep‐17 MTN 15‐Sep‐2017 213,000,000 326,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 09-Oct-2007 Bond
SBAEI 8.2500 
15‐Sep‐17 15‐Sep‐2017 5,000,000 5,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 02-Jul-2012 Bond
SBAEI 9.3500 
24‐Feb‐19 24‐Feb‐2019 100,000,000 100,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 24-Feb-2012 Bond
SBAEI 9.6500 
26‐Mar‐19 26‐Mar‐2019 500,000,000 500,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 26-Mar-2012 Bond
SBAEI 8.8700 
24‐May‐19 24‐May‐2019 2,714,000,000 2,714,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 24-May-2012 Bond
SBAEI 7.2500 
15‐Jan‐20 15‐Jan‐2020 5,302,000 5,302,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 29-May-2012 Bond
SBAEI 8.6000 
16‐Nov‐21 16‐Nov‐2021 500,000,000 500,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 16-Nov-2006 Bond
SBAEI 10.1800 
23‐Jun‐21 MTN 23‐Jun‐2021 2,100,000,000 2,100,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 23-Jun-2011 Bond
SBAEI 6.7500 
31‐Mar‐21 31‐Mar‐2021 58,700,000 58,700,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 26-Apr-2012 Bond
SBAEI 6.7500 
31‐Mar‐21 31‐Mar‐2021 391,600,000 391,600,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 07-May-2012 Bond
SBAEI 9.6600 
01‐Dec‐22 '12 01‐Dec‐2022 1,780,000,000 1,780,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 01-Dec-2011 Bond
SBAEI 8.2000 
25‐May‐26 25‐May‐2026 750,000,000 750,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 25-May-2006 Bond
SBAEI 10.0500 
15‐May‐26 
MTN 15‐May‐2026 1,894,000,000 1,894,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 15-May-2012 Bond
SBAEI 8.1200 
18‐Apr‐28 18‐Apr‐2028 200,000,000 200,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 15-Nov-2006 Bond
STANDARD BANK
A1
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NEDJN / NEDJ 
10.5500 15‐Sep‐
15 15‐Sep‐2015 2,000,000,000 2,000,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 09-Sep-2009 Bond
NEDJN / NEDJ 
9.6800 19‐Apr‐
15 MTN 19‐Apr‐2015 478,000,000 478,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 19-Apr-2010 Bond
NEDJN / NEDJ 
11.3900 09‐Sep‐
19 MTN 09‐Sep‐2019 1,273,000,000 1,273,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 24-Nov-2009 Bond
NEDJN / NEDJ 
10.5400 17‐Sep‐
20 '15 MTN 17‐Sep‐2020 1,000,000,000 1,000,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 17-Sep-2007 Bond
FSRJHB / FSRJ 
8.0000 15‐Sep‐
16 MTN 15‐Sep‐2016 924,000,000 924,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 04-Apr-2012 Bond
FSRJHB / FSRJ 
8.5000 15‐Sep‐
17 MTN 15‐Sep‐2017 1,086,500,000 1,086,500,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 04-Apr-2012 Bond
FSRJ 7.4700 20‐
Jun‐17 20‐Jun‐2017 18,000,000 18,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 01-Jun-2012 Bond
FSRJ 7.4100 20‐
Jun‐17 20‐Jun‐2017 12,000,000 12,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 01-Jun-2012 Bond
FSRJHB / FSRJ 
5.0750 20‐Sep‐
17 20‐Sep‐2017 10,000,000 10,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 21-Sep-2012 Bond
FSRJ 10.5000 
14‐Apr‐18 MTN 14‐Apr‐2018 1,581,000,000 1,581,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 14-Apr-2010 Bond
FSRJHB / FSRJ 
9.0000 15‐Nov‐
19 MTN 15‐Nov‐2019 1,766,000,000 1,766,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 04-Apr-2012 Bond
FSRJHB / FSRJ 
10.7500 10‐Dec‐
24 10‐Dec‐2024 943,000,000 943,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 10-Dec-2009 Bond
FSRJHB / FSRJ 
9.5000 21‐Feb‐
31 MTN 21‐Feb‐2031 5,000,000,000 5,000,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 21-Feb-2011 Bond
FSRJHB / FSRJ 
2.0000 26‐Jan‐
42 MTN 26‐Jan‐2042 100,000,000 100,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 26-Jan-2012 Bond
FSRJHB / FSRJ 
8.0000 14‐Apr‐
45 MTN 14‐Apr‐2045 175,000,000 175,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 14-Apr-2010 Bond
NEDBANK
FIRSTRAND 
A1 (continued)
 	 Page	39	 		 	
 
 
 
 
ABSP 8.9500 23‐
Feb‐16 MTN 23‐Feb‐2016 7,599,305 9,199,305 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 01-Mar-2012 Bond
ABSP 9.1300 23‐
Mar‐16 MTN 23‐Mar‐2016 35,131,534 35,231,534 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 30-Mar-2012 Bond
ABSP 8.9500 12‐
Apr‐16 MTN 12‐Apr‐2016 1,016,096 1,016,096 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 19-Apr-2012 Bond
ABSP 8.7200 18‐
May‐16 MTN 18‐May‐2016 11,602,939 11,602,939 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 25-May-2012 Bond
ABSP 8.5000 01‐
Jun‐16 MTN 01‐Jun‐2016 17,215,700 17,235,700 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 08-Jun-2012 Bond
ABSP 8.5890 14‐
Jun‐16 MTN 14‐Jun‐2016 4,630,690 4,630,690 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 21-Jun-2012 Bond
ABSP 7.6000 20‐
Jul‐16 MTN 20‐Jul‐2016 301,253 5,768,253 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 27-Jul-2012 Bond
ABSP 7.6300 23‐
Aug‐16 MTN 23‐Aug‐2016 7,160,315 7,160,315 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 30-Aug-2012 Bond
ABSP 9.8000 20‐
Jun‐19 20‐Jun‐2019 200,000,000 200,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 12-Apr-2012 Bond
ABSP 8.2000 01‐
Jun‐20 01‐Jun‐2020 1,152,000,000 1,152,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 18-Jun-2007 Bond
ABSP 8.2950 21‐
Nov‐23 '18 
MTN 21‐Nov‐2023 1,188,000,000 1,188,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 21-Nov-2012 Bond
ABSP 8.8000 11‐
Sep‐26 MTN 11‐Sep‐2026 2,700,000,000 2,700,000,000 
Fixed 
Coupon
South 
Africa
South 
African 
Rand 11-Sep-2007 Bond
BARCLAYS AFRICA 
A1 (continued)
A1 continued Financial Sector % 
Total corporate bonds  1500 
Major Commercial banks 912 
Percentage 61% 
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Earnings announcement dates Firm Bond abnormal 
returns ‐  [0,1] 
interval
Forecast errors JSE Top 40 index 
return
Dummy
09/09/2014 Firstrand ‐0.11% 5.45% ‐0.09% 1
08/14/2014 Std Bank 0.04% ‐7.26% 0.11% 1
08/05/2014 Nedbank ‐0.02% 7.30% 0.21% 1
07/30/2014 BAGL ‐0.01% ‐0.50% ‐0.51% 1
03/06/2014 Std Bank ‐0.07% 5.00% ‐0.20% 1
03/04/2014 Firstrand ‐0.12% 5.59% 0.09% 1
02/24/2014 Nedbank ‐0.06% 13.67% ‐0.11% 1
02/11/2014 BAGL ‐0.03% 4.32% 0.69% 1
09/10/2013 Firstrand ‐0.08% ‐0.78% 0.49% 1
08/15/2013 Std Bank ‐0.07% 1.54% 0.10% 1
08/06/2013 Nedbank 0.11% 0.40% 0.49% 1
07/30/2013 BAGL 0.15% ‐8.89% 0.66% 1
03/07/2013 Std Bank ‐0.05% 11.36% 0.28% 1
03/05/2013 Firstrand ‐0.07% 1.54% 0.71% 1
02/25/2013 Nedbank 0.11% 3.77% 0.28% 1
02/12/2013 BAGL ‐0.05% ‐2.04% ‐0.22% 1
Earnings announcement dates Firm Bond abnormal 
returns ‐  [0,2] 
interval
Forecast errors JSE Top 40 index 
return
Dummy
09/09/2014 Firstrand ‐0.90% 5.45% ‐0.19% 1
08/14/2014 Std Bank 0.31% ‐7.26% 0.22% 1
08/05/2014 Nedbank ‐0.16% 7.30% 0.41% 1
07/30/2014 BAGL ‐0.06% ‐0.50% ‐1.02% 1
03/06/2014 Std Bank ‐0.53% 5.00% ‐0.40% 1
03/04/2014 Firstrand ‐0.95% 5.59% 0.18% 1
02/24/2014 Nedbank ‐0.50% 13.67% ‐0.21% 1
02/11/2014 BAGL ‐0.28% 4.32% 1.38% 1
09/10/2013 Firstrand ‐0.66% ‐0.78% 0.97% 1
08/15/2013 Std Bank ‐0.55% 1.54% 0.19% 1
08/06/2013 Nedbank 0.90% 0.40% 0.98% 1
07/30/2013 BAGL 1.19% ‐8.89% 1.31% 1
03/07/2013 Std Bank ‐0.41% 11.36% 0.55% 1
03/05/2013 Firstrand ‐0.52% 1.54% 1.43% 1
02/25/2013 Nedbank 0.88% 3.77% 0.57% 1
02/12/2013 BAGL ‐0.41% ‐2.04% ‐0.44% 1
Earnings announcement dates Firm Bond abnormal 
returns ‐  [0,3] 
interval
Forecast errors JSE Top 40 index 
return
Dummy
09/09/2014 Firstrand ‐0.34% 5.45% ‐0.28% 1
08/14/2014 Std Bank 0.12% ‐7.26% 0.32% 1
08/05/2014 Nedbank ‐0.06% 7.30% 0.62% 1
07/30/2014 BAGL ‐0.02% ‐0.50% ‐1.52% 1
03/06/2014 Std Bank ‐0.20% 5.00% ‐0.61% 1
03/04/2014 Firstrand ‐0.36% 5.59% 0.28% 1
02/24/2014 Nedbank ‐0.19% 13.67% ‐0.32% 1
02/11/2014 BAGL ‐0.10% 4.32% 2.07% 1
09/10/2013 Firstrand ‐0.25% ‐0.78% 1.46% 1
08/15/2013 Std Bank ‐0.21% 1.54% 0.29% 1
08/06/2013 Nedbank 0.34% 0.40% 1.47% 1
07/30/2013 BAGL 0.45% ‐8.89% 1.97% 1
03/07/2013 Std Bank ‐0.15% 11.36% 0.83% 1
03/05/2013 Firstrand ‐0.20% 1.54% 2.14% 1
02/25/2013 Nedbank 0.33% 3.77% 0.85% 1
02/12/2013 BAGL ‐0.15% ‐2.04% ‐0.66% 1
Earnings announcement dates Firm Bond abnormal 
returns ‐  [0,4] 
interval
Forecast errors JSE Top 40 index 
return
Dummy
09/09/2014 Firstrand ‐0.45% 5.45% ‐0.37% 1
08/14/2014 Std Bank 0.15% ‐7.26% 0.43% 1
08/05/2014 Nedbank ‐0.08% 7.30% 0.82% 1
07/30/2014 BAGL ‐0.03% ‐0.50% ‐2.03% 1
03/06/2014 Std Bank ‐0.26% 5.00% ‐0.81% 1
03/04/2014 Firstrand ‐0.47% 5.59% 0.37% 1
02/24/2014 Nedbank ‐0.25% 13.67% ‐0.42% 1
02/11/2014 BAGL ‐0.14% 4.32% 2.76% 1
09/10/2013 Firstrand ‐0.33% ‐0.78% 1.95% 1
08/15/2013 Std Bank ‐0.28% 1.54% 0.39% 1
08/06/2013 Nedbank 0.45% 0.40% 1.96% 1
07/30/2013 BAGL 0.60% ‐8.89% 2.62% 1
03/07/2013 Std Bank ‐0.21% 11.36% 1.11% 1
03/05/2013 Firstrand ‐0.26% 1.54% 2.85% 1
02/25/2013 Nedbank 0.44% 3.77% 1.14% 1
02/12/2013 BAGL ‐0.20% ‐2.04% ‐0.88% 1
A2    Sample
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Earnings announcement dates Firm Stock abnormal 
returns ‐  [0,1] 
interval
Forecast errors JSE Top 40 index 
return
Dummy
09/09/2014 Firstrand ‐1.12% 5.45% ‐0.09% 1
08/14/2014 Std Bank ‐1.03% ‐7.26% 0.11% 1
08/05/2014 Nedbank 0.33% 7.30% 0.21% 1
07/30/2014 BAGL ‐0.03% ‐0.50% ‐0.51% 1
03/06/2014 Std Bank 0.21% 5.00% ‐0.20% 1
03/04/2014 Firstrand 0.12% 5.59% 0.09% 1
02/24/2014 Nedbank 0.21% 13.67% ‐0.11% 1
02/11/2014 BAGL 0.68% 4.32% 0.69% 1
09/10/2013 Firstrand 0.94% ‐0.78% 0.49% 1
08/15/2013 Std Bank ‐0.13% 1.54% 0.10% 1
08/06/2013 Nedbank 0.20% 0.40% 0.49% 1
07/30/2013 BAGL ‐1.87% ‐8.89% 0.66% 1
03/07/2013 Std Bank 0.33% 11.36% 0.28% 1
03/05/2013 Firstrand ‐0.01% 1.54% 0.71% 1
02/25/2013 Nedbank 0.68% 3.77% 0.28% 1
02/12/2013 BAGL 0.19% ‐2.04% ‐0.22% 1
Earnings announcement dates Firm Stock abnormal 
returns ‐  [0,2] 
interval
Forecast errors JSE Top 40 index 
return
Dummy
09/09/2014 Firstrand ‐2.25% 5.45% ‐0.19% 1
08/14/2014 Std Bank ‐2.07% ‐7.26% 0.22% 1
08/05/2014 Nedbank 0.65% 7.30% 0.41% 1
07/30/2014 BAGL ‐0.06% ‐0.50% ‐1.02% 1
03/06/2014 Std Bank 0.42% 5.00% ‐0.40% 1
03/04/2014 Firstrand 0.25% 5.59% 0.18% 1
02/24/2014 Nedbank 0.42% 13.67% ‐0.21% 1
02/11/2014 BAGL 1.36% 4.32% 1.38% 1
09/10/2013 Firstrand 1.88% ‐0.78% 0.97% 1
08/15/2013 Std Bank ‐0.27% 1.54% 0.19% 1
08/06/2013 Nedbank 0.40% 0.40% 0.98% 1
07/30/2013 BAGL ‐3.75% ‐8.89% 1.31% 1
03/07/2013 Std Bank 0.67% 11.36% 0.55% 1
03/05/2013 Firstrand ‐0.03% 1.54% 1.43% 1
02/25/2013 Nedbank 1.36% 3.77% 0.57% 1
02/12/2013 BAGL 0.38% ‐2.04% ‐0.44% 1
Earnings announcement dates Firm Stock abnormal 
returns ‐  [0,3] 
interval
Forecast errors JSE Top 40 index 
return
Dummy
09/09/2014 Firstrand ‐3.37% 5.45% ‐0.28% 1
08/14/2014 Std Bank ‐3.10% ‐7.26% 0.32% 1
08/05/2014 Nedbank 0.98% 7.30% 0.62% 1
07/30/2014 BAGL ‐0.09% ‐0.50% ‐1.52% 1
03/06/2014 Std Bank 0.63% 5.00% ‐0.61% 1
03/04/2014 Firstrand 0.37% 5.59% 0.28% 1
02/24/2014 Nedbank 0.63% 13.67% ‐0.32% 1
02/11/2014 BAGL 2.04% 4.32% 2.07% 1
09/10/2013 Firstrand 2.83% ‐0.78% 1.46% 1
08/15/2013 Std Bank ‐0.40% 1.54% 0.29% 1
08/06/2013 Nedbank 0.60% 0.40% 1.47% 1
07/30/2013 BAGL ‐5.62% ‐8.89% 1.97% 1
03/07/2013 Std Bank 1.00% 11.36% 0.83% 1
03/05/2013 Firstrand ‐0.04% 1.54% 2.14% 1
02/25/2013 Nedbank 2.04% 3.77% 0.85% 1
02/12/2013 BAGL 0.56% ‐2.04% ‐0.66% 1
Earnings announcement dates Firm Stock abnormal 
returns ‐  [0,4] 
interval
Forecast errors JSE Top 40 index 
return
Dummy
09/09/2014 Firstrand ‐4.49% 5.45% ‐0.37% 1
08/14/2014 Std Bank ‐4.13% ‐7.26% 0.43% 1
08/05/2014 Nedbank 1.31% 7.30% 0.82% 1
07/30/2014 BAGL ‐0.11% ‐0.50% ‐2.03% 1
03/06/2014 Std Bank 0.85% 5.00% ‐0.81% 1
03/04/2014 Firstrand 0.50% 5.59% 0.37% 1
02/24/2014 Nedbank 0.85% 13.67% ‐0.42% 1
02/11/2014 BAGL 2.72% 4.32% 2.76% 1
09/10/2013 Firstrand 3.77% ‐0.78% 1.95% 1
08/15/2013 Std Bank ‐0.53% 1.54% 0.39% 1
08/06/2013 Nedbank 0.80% 0.40% 1.96% 1
07/30/2013 BAGL ‐7.50% ‐8.89% 2.62% 1
03/07/2013 Std Bank 1.33% 11.36% 1.11% 1
03/05/2013 Firstrand ‐0.06% 1.54% 2.85% 1
02/25/2013 Nedbank 2.72% 3.77% 1.14% 1
02/12/2013 BAGL 0.75% ‐2.04% ‐0.88% 1
A3   Sample
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